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Abstract—Biometric security depends on its accuracy and
efficiency, but is especially vulnerable to spoof attacks. Currently
liveness detection has become the standard method of reducing
the impact of spoof attacks, however whilst this protects against
spoof creation and presentation, it does nothing to detect legiti-
mate users being coerced into accessing systems. This paper looks
at this coercion concept, indicating the impact coercion could
have on biometric security and how it can be detected. This
paper will identify scenarios in which coercion detection could
improve security as well as identifying the underlying concepts
that make this area up, culminating in the presentation of four
high level techniques which can be implemented within a multi-
modal biometric system to detect coercion detection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Coercion detection is a currently an underused but neces-
sary component of biometric security. Currently, there are no
methods of detection if a user is being coerced into authenti-
cating. If an attacker coerces a legitimate user to authenticate
into a secure system, then they will bypass all of the intruder
detection facilities that may be in place, subsequently making
any spoof detection techniques employed irrelevant. The cur-
rent process of biometric authentication revolves around the
collection of a sample that is then processed until a decision
to either accept or reject the user has been made. One of
the main techniques to bypass this process is the use of
spoof samples, which are presented to the system during the
sample collection stage of authentication. These spoof samples
allow non-authorised users to access the system by using a
sample stolen from a legitimate user, therefore bypassing many
security techniques. Liveness detection was formed to address
this spoof threat and minimises the impact of sample theft
and presentation. However sample theft and spoof development
deals with spoof provision, and is checked after the user has
already provided their data to the authentication process. This
paper focuses on what will occur if a legitimate user is coerced
into providing their authentication details to the system. This
problem occurs at the start of the authentication procedure and
has the potential to render other security techniques, such as
liveness detection, inconsequential.
II. COERCION SCENARIOS
To coercion a user, is to force them to do something they do
not want to do by using threats and/or force. Therefore during
the process of coercion the psychological factors, of the user,
will change depending on the situation. It is these physiological
factors that can then be gathered and analysed to denote if
coercion is occurring during an authentication attempt.
Regardless of how coercion is measured, the first question
would be to denote if a coercion detection technique would
benefit biometric security. The following provides some basic
scenarios that would benefit from this addition to the technol-
ogy.
1) Banks and shops have access to vaults and tills
which are choice targets for thieves. The official UK
definition of robbery is ”A person is guilty of robbery
if he steals, and immediately before or at the time
of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force
on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in
fear of being then and there subjected to force” [1].
In the UK 2014 there was 40,000 cases [2] of rob-
bery. However, the inclusion of integrated biometric
security and coercion techniques, on vaults and cash
registers, would reduce the number of robberies as it
would be harder for employees to access the devices
during coercion. This is because the employee, during
a robbery, is forced to aid the perpetrator by providing
the goods or by accessing either the vault or till, as
they would have the correct biometric authentication
to do so. However, if a coercion techniques such as
facial muscle movement is used to denote coercion
then the authentication process can be halted, and the
attacker will be denied access. Similarly, shop tills
could be equipped with skin conductivity coercion
techniques, within fingerprint authentication systems,
that would prevent staff opening the tills if coercion
is detection, again preventing the attacker access to
the system.
2) Due to the risk of terrorism and the disasters that have
occurred over the past decade and a half, the inclusion
of secure coercion biometrics would prevent attackers
accessing transport controls. There have been ten
plane hijackings, ignoring corporate jet and military
transports, since 2010 [3]. The inclusion of coercion
techniques could prevent a hijacker accessing the
cockpit, or another control centre on transports such
as trains or boats. This is especially pertinent when
considering naval travel, as piracy is one area that has
been increasing significantly [4] in the last decade.
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Therefore, the inclusion of coercion detection on
bridges that would minimise the effect of piracy by
not allowing attackers access to the control area by
forcing an authorised user to authenticate.
As these examples show the inclusion of coercion detection
techniques could help prevent illegal access to a variety of
systems. The next question is to identify where coercion
detection would be best implemented. This will be done by
identifying the threat vectors for coercion detection, and iden-
tifying where best to implemented coercion detection methods.
Therefore, the identification of coercion based threat vectors
will allow pertinent defence measures to be developed that will
improve the overall level of security for biometric authentica-
tion. Practically this could reduce the ease in which attackers
coerce authorised users into authenticating and could minimise
factors such as hijacking, vault robberies, etc. Subsequently,
the purpose of this paper is to identify where the threat vectors
occur during the biometric authentication process and what
methods of minimising these vectors can be identified. These
prevention techniques will be discussed regarding their threat
vector minimising impact.
III. CURRENT THREAT VECTORS
The original method of identifying threats to biometric sys-
tems was to highlight the areas of vulnerability that occurred
during the authentication process. This has been documented
thoroughly by [5] [6] [7] amongst others and each iteration
has highlighted more threat vectors to content with as demon-
strated by Figure 1 which identifies four specific threat areas.
Fig. 1: Expanded threat vectors based [8]’s work
[8] identified four areas in which attacks might occur
which are; user interface attacks, inter-modal attack, module
attacks and template database attacks which are shown in
Figure 1. User interface attacks involve the use of a fake
or spoof biometric characteristics which such as the gummy
fingers technique, HD imagery and so on [9] [10]. The second
vector addresses the potential security issues that occur during
the communication process between different modules/entities
within the authentication process such as remote interception
of signals or from a local jammer/interceptor. These attacks are
conducted by nefarious users who substitutes their signal that
can result in sample manipulation or by changing the location
of a correct template and replacing it with a spoofed template.
The third attack is a Trojan Horse like attack that creates a
backdoor into the system. This allows the attacker to execute
their code regardless of previous security provisions. However
this can be countered by including secure software practices
and the inclusion of specialised hardware/software which will
improve the chance that the algorithmic integrity of the process
is maintained. The fourth attack vector details attacks related
to the template database and has the potential to be one of the
most devastating attacks as the template database is where all
of the enrolment samples are kept ready for matching. There
are some issues that can arise from this kind of security breach:
it allows the attacker to substitute a spoof biometric template
with one that contains the attackers, or their representatives,
sample. Subsequently, this gives the attacker the ability to
access legitimately the system (from the system’s viewpoint)
or the ability to create an official template, therefore, creating a
legitimate way into the system that does not rely on the initial
attack, therefore becoming harder to both trace and solve.
These threat vectors highlight the base biometric vulner-
abilities however this does not necessarily mean that the
same vectors will be more or less important for coercion
detection. Therefore the identification of any coercion centric
threat vectors, and any methods of reducing these threats is
paramount to minimise the effects on the overall security. If
these vectors are not considered then attackers will have a
much easier method of bypassing system security potentially
leading to a greater quantity of coercion based attacks. The
next section will identify where coercion can create a threat
vector, new or current, and will lead on to proposing techniques
to minimise these vectors.
To begin this process the definition of coercion was sought
so that it could be kept at the forefront of development. “To
persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force
or threats”is how [11] describes coercion. When considered
in context, this means to force an unwilling user to utilise
their biometric sample to gain access to a system, therefore
bypassing the main security and liveness methods as the
sample used is valid. Therefore, how will it be possible to
detect if a user is being coerced into a system? To identify
this the following questions have been considered:
1) What current threat vector are there for coercion [8]?
2) What coercion attacks can be used?
3) What coercion detection techniques need to be devel-
oped?
A. Coercion Threat Vectors
Due to the user centric method of system breaching, coer-
cion techniques focus heavily on the sample provision/sensor
stage of the biometric process. This is because to coerce a
user, the attacker must force the user to provide something. In
this case the authorised sample and this is only done at the
sensor layer. However the whilst this is the main threat vector
the potential solutions can work at different stages within
the overall biometric process. This would depend on what
technique of coercion detection was being provided voluntary
or involuntary.
When considering coercion the primary method of de-
tection is gathering and analysing the physiological changes
associated with specific emotional responses. The primary
of which being fear, but other similar emotions such as
stress and disgust can also be used. These can be gathered
at a very high level as [12] postulates saying that when
using functional magnetic resonance imaging healthy humans,
required a negative connectivity with the cortical and sub-
cortical pathways towards the amygdala (set of neurons within
the temporal lobe) therefore potentially enabling fear to be
detected. However, while it may be possible to detect fear
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in this manner, the technique required would prove prohibitive
within most installations, except in extreme circumstances, due
to the cost, implementation difficulties and acceptance of the
technique.
As already mentioned the main area of threat is the sample
provision area. This is because if an attack is based elsewhere
then it will be handled by other factors, such as temple
protection schemes, encryption liveness detection etc.
To highlight this a work flow for a coerced authentication
has been developed.
1) User is approached and forced to start the authenti-
cation process
2) User provides sample to Sensor
3) Sensor data is processed to Feature Extractor
4) Extracted features are send to Matcher
5) Matcher uses Template Database to create score.
6) Score is sent Decision Maker
7) Access is either granted or refused.
This indicates that the only threat vector for coercion is
at the sample provision stage. However, this does not mean
that the only place for coercion detection is based around the
sensor area. This would depend on the biometric - coercion
fusion of the system. For example, coercion detection could
be deployed at the sensor level however as there is no analysis
of the sample until the feature extractor process the coercion
techniques would be based here. However if a techniques such
as Intentional False Authentication is used, then there could be
a sub-module within the sample collection process which iden-
tifies what sample has been provided. This would not extract
features for the security process. Instead it would simple look
for an intentional false authentication data provision. This can
be seen within Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Coercion detection techniques application to threat
vectors
As Figure 2 shows while the main threat vector is at
the sensor level and can be dealt with by a IFA technique,
different types of coercion detection techniques can apply
throughout the authentication process such as TKT at the
decision making stage. There are obvious factors that need
to be considered when creating coercion detection techniques
such as user intimidation, forgetfulness or poor knowledge.
Therefore to minimise this issue other techniques of coercion
detection are considered, however, to do this the different
types of coercion detection techniques were considered and
proposed.These factors underline some of the basic concepts
within coercion and the current thinking is to split techniques
by their individual requirements, in much the same way
liveness detection characteristics are considered. For coercion,
this means that they are categorised as either involuntary,
voluntary or environmental.
1) Involuntary Techniques: Involuntary techniques cover a
large range of factors using physiological signals provided by
the user’s auto-response to specific stimuli. Coercion detections
physiological signals would correspond to emotional outputs
such as fear, stress and so on. Therefore deviation from a
predefined median level would denote active coercion and the
system could act accordingly. There are a variety of emotions
that could be used to denote coercion such as stress, fear,
disgust and so on. There has been great success gathering data
based on these emotions as shown by [13] and [14] utilising
skin conductivity response tests.
However, there are some disadvantages associated with
this technique when specifically using stress as an indicator
of coercion. This is due to the ubiquity of stress within the
modern workplace environment; therefore it can be claimed
that it would not necessarily denote coercion, instead it would
be caused by a host of other factors such as exercise, ten-
sion, work related stress etc. Therefore,stress’s suitability as a
coercion indicator [15] would be questionable.
These affect feedback techniques have been studied for
many years, primarily within the HCI and machine learning
areas as identified by [16]. One universal problem with these
physiological data capture techniques is that there is a range
of noise factors that can cause the data to peak and trough.
Without techniques such as this, noise can have a huge effect
on coercion detection. One such example uses blood pressure
levels to detection coercion. Elevated blood pressure can be
caused by fear, and subsequently can be used to denote
coercion, by taking advantage of the fight or flight reflex
discussed by [17] and iterated upon for the subsequent Cannon-
Bard Theory [18]. The main question here is how can this
data be differentiated from simple blood pressure elevation
caused by medical noise or physical exertion. Therefore, when
developing with these techniques and consideration, the onus
must be put on technique and its capabilities to identify
relevant data. This noise data is very important and adequate
noise cancellation techniques must be developed to produce
accurate results, however this is not within the scope of this
paper.
The key factor to consider with involuntary techniques
is that the technique do not rely on the user knowingly
providing coercion data. Therefore the fusion capabilities of
the technique can be greater than with involuntary techniques,
additionally the subtly of the technique will also be much
greater potentially making the process safer for users. However
there are a plethora of ethical, legal and social factors to
consider with automated sample gathering techniques.
2) Voluntary Techniques: While most coercion techniques
revolve around the automatic gathering of physiological data;
voluntary techniques focus more on the user providing data
to the system that it can then use to denote coercion. These
techniques are voluntary approaches because they rely on the
user to provide data of some kind, and while it can be argued
that medical techniques are also voluntary, the distinction is
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that there is an additional conscious process, by the user, to
provide a sample. This is normally done with non-medical
data, for example, speaking a password or selecting a pattern.
There is a variety of forms this could take, for example,
the user may carry a key that may be used as a ’panic
alarm’. A second approach would be to utilise a selection of
passcodes/keys, that do not correspond to the correct authen-
tication pass-code, instead they would be there to specifically
denote coercion. Although to be thoroughly effective the
technique would have to be completely integrated within the
full biometric system. Otherwise the use of the traditional key
system would be seen as a simple and easier approach to se-
curity. Without the thorough integration, it would also become
obvious to the attacker that some preventative measure was
being taken as the inclusion of a key in the final stage would
become suspicious and therefore reduce the effectiveness of
the technique.
This highlights one of the main problems with voluntary
techniques; the user is responsible for the data submission.
This can lead to problems occurring including users being
unable to provide the data, providing incorrect data due or even
a lack of subtlety when providing the sample. This subtlety
factor becomes very important when considering different
techniques of data submission. If a technique is subtly and
easy to present then it is harder for the attacker to detect the
subterfuge.
3) Environmental Techniques: Whilst the other techniques
focus on the user as a data provider, environmental techniques
instead utilises the environment as an indicator of coercion.
This technique can be problematic to implement as it does not
focus on the different variants of the user, instead it correlates
data regarding the user as a focus point. For example the
use of cameras and proximity maps can depict if there are
people close together. Whilst on its own this does not denote
coercion, when combined with appropriate security protocols
the technique can become more impressive. For example, all
users must make sure they are standing on their own when
authenticating into a system, no more than one user next to a
biometric scanner at any one time etc. Therefore, if a proximity
sensor is able to detect multiple people closer together then it
can indicate coercion.
Obviously there is a host of potential problems with this
form of approach, least of all the ease of misunderstanding.
Using the above example, if two users were carrying a heavy
parcel, they would be identified as coercion and therefore the
system would respond, in this case erroneously. There are also
other noise based concerns, such as how other data sets impact
the system, can humans be identified specifically or will other
species cause a false rejection, will other heat signatures set of
proximity response and if so how can this be dealt with. These
false reject samples would create a generally untenable system
and it is for this reason that most environmental techniques
have been dismissed in this research.
For these reasons it might be practical to use environmental
techniques as a secondary authentication, especially if coercion
fusion is being considered. By using an affect technique as the
primary data collection tool and an environmental technique
as the secondary scanner. This would improve the overall
security, and would allow the system to more easily deal with
coercion, however it would also add complexity, time of scans
and overall efficiency. This coercion fusion is something that
merits further research bu has not been covered in this paper.
These techniques show the styles of coercion detection
that can be developed. However to properly develop coercion
detection techniques an understanding of what underlying
characteristics are required. Therefore the next section will
cover the salient characteristics pertinent to coercion detection.
IV. DEVELOPMENT
While the discussion and development of actual techniques
are very important, there is a plethora of other concerns such
as the identification of the underlying principles relevant to
the development and implementation of coercion techniques.
The following highlight the main factors to consider when
developing a coercion detection technique.
A. Performance
Due to the potential variety of coercion detection, the
performance of the individual methods can differ dramatically
depending on the type and effect of said technique. For
example, a tangible ’panic key’ can have a high-performance
measurement as they are easy to use, cheap to manufacture
and already quite ubiquitous in society however they can be
easily circumvented. Alternatively, techniques using affect data
are much harder to quantify due to the range of divergences.
This is primarily due to the lack of available data on coercion
techniques and the emphasis of physiological testing in social
sciences instead of computer science. Most of this research,
into stress and fear detection, has been conducted in other areas
such as [14]s work based around poker, and while the focus is
different to coercion detection, the premise postulated therein
can still be applied due to the underlying non-specificity. For
example, this particular work identifies that detecting stress
and lying only achieved an 82% and 71% success rate, which
would provide a very poor degree of security, however this
figure would have to be taken into account considering the age
of the research, the subject area it is being considered in and
the specific techniques of data collection as another research
has had markedly superior results such as the 90% success rate
within [16]s work. Another flaw, for direct security use is that
this many technique require long periods of data collection,
such as [14]’s work where testers would have data collected
about them for an extended period (approximately 15 minutes)
which would not be viable within coercion detection, as like
biometric security and liveness detection the speed in which
the sample is gathered and process is of utmost importance.
While these techniques could be utilised in a variety
of situations, the exact implementation would be colossally
ineffective due to the time was taken to gather samples.
Therefore, any techniques would have to be suitably adapted
to the needs of coercion detection and the specific environment
being designed for. The main point of these distinctions is to
show that the effectiveness of a technique is not limited just
to the current lack of techniques. Instead it is only limited by
an overall lack of research and understanding of the scenarios
it is being utilised in. Therefore to identify performance, the
main factors to consider would be the speed of data collection,
the accuracy of data collected and ease of implementation.
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B. Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity, while often focusing on devices, is a factor
that can have far reaching implications throughout the devel-
opment of systems. Within coercion detection, the heterogene-
ity of techniques can also be considered as the specificity
level. This details the ease in which the techniques can be
incorporated across multiple scenarios, techniques and devices.
Therefore, it must be identified, as thoroughly as possible,
what techniques are most relevant and which are best suited
to individual implementation.
As coercion detection is an extension of biometric security
the comparative link between security, liveness and coercion
must also be considered and this tri-modal will identify what
is most relevant within the situation. A lack of heterogeneity
here will cause numerous problems to occur such as lack
of efficiency. These factors lead to the following assumption
that the most effective techniques will be those that can be
used throughout the different levels of biometric security.
Therefore, creating a thoroughly integrated multi-modal, and
multi-security system.
C. Fusion
Fusion details how the techniques will work within the
overall biometric environment. How will it integrate with the
basic security process as well as the liveness process. When
dealing with fusion, the main focus is to combine different
techniques, from whatever stage of the security process they
are at, in the most efficient and effective way possible. This is
normally done within each section, for example, a multi-modal
biometric system would contain iris and facial recognition
to improve the overall degree of security, within liveness
detection blood pressure and skin conductivity tests may be
undertaken. While this is the normal route, there is also the
additional concept of multi-layer fusion.
As well as the initial fusion between coercion techniques,
layered fusion would have to be considered within multi-
modal systems. Fusion that would contend with security,
liveness, and coercion methods would have to consider the
relevant techniques in more detail, as while one technique
may be acceptable for a security and liveness environment,
the incorporation of coercion may turn the technique into an
ineffective style. For example [13] identifies that when utilis-
ing multi-modal vocal and emotive systems the effectiveness
drops with emotive speech, therefore showing that fusion does
not necessarily mean automatic improvement. Alongside this
would be specific extra problems, as the emotive aspects would
be utilised as an integral part of coercion detection due to
the emotional undertones of the subject, therefore degrading
the technique even further. This exemplifies the necessity to
make sure that the techniques used are the most applicable,
and while this is very difficult to do currently due to the lack
of techniques and the poor categorisation system.
D. Cultural implication
Unlike many areas of computer science, the effect of
culture within the subject is minimal or non-existent, coercion
detection has some definite cultural implications. These occur
due to the innate individuality of coercion detecting techniques,
and it is not just cultural but individual implications that
can dramatically effect the way coercion detecting techniques
work. For example, certain cultures may find specific tech-
niques distasteful and, therefore, there would be an unwilling-
ness to accept their integration into systems [19]. While there
are minimal technical factors that would effect this the cultural
implication could have wide-ranging effects and therefore,
the user acceptance would be required to complete a final
implementation.
E. Medical Implications
Medical data comprises the main bulk of biometric detec-
tion samples, therefore, demanding constant reinforcement of
validity, permanence, etc. These factors can be dramatically
affected by medical intra-variance due to the transient nature
of physiological based data. These effects can dramatically
change a collected sample to such a degree that they would
classify as being coerced even when they are not, completely
due to the medical noise factors. For example, a user that is
being coerced may have an elevated blood pressure due to the
physiological, and psychological, stimuli identified in the fight
and flight reflex postulated by [17] and discussed in countless
works such as [20].Alternatively, the user could have jogged
to work similarly elevating their blood pressure. While this
concept is overly simplified the premise holds true throughout
the technique.
Therefore, it is imperative that different techniques are
assessed on the relevant susceptibility to medical factors which
is especially important when considering any fusion plans.
This is because the combinations of similar techniques for
both liveness and coercion, while potentially efficient, would
provide a large target for nefarious user’s spoof attacks based
on medical data. Additionally, if the same characteristic for
liveness and coercion detection is being used as a standard,
then they are even more so susceptible to medical noise that
affects the singular data type, for example, blood pressure
deviations.
F. User Acceptance
A traditional problem with new technology and especially
biometric systems is the user acceptance of the technology
[21] [22]. While users can sometimes be reluctant to adopt new
technology, for a variety of reasons, including age, background,
opinion, etc. [23]. As [8] identifies biometric samples deriving
from data that is often very personal to a user, data that is rarely
called upon for any other reason, except for medical situations,
immediately providing cause for potential consternation. For
example, the taking of fingerprints may well have criminal
connotations for users due to the technology’s ubiquity within
law enforcement scenarios. Liveness samples may include
blood pressure monitors that obviously have some definitive
health connotations, including the user’s unwillingness to
accept medical information, because of embarrassment or fear,
etc. The same features can also have the same problems for
coercion detection. Therefore, when implementations occur,
sufficient consideration must be given to the acceptance of
the technology, because if a user does not wish to use the
device/technique then, it would be difficult to expand in.
This reluctance would cause a host of issues for most
biometric, liveness and coercion techniques as the primary
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form of the sample would be more difficult to identify and
utilise, making voluntary techniques exceedingly difficult to
implement. Secondly biometric systems have had a very bad
press within the media and there are numerous occasions
where biometric systems have been spoofed due to the loss
of or theft of a sample, both within real environments, and
a host of popular cultural formats. While these opinions are
often erroneous, due to the elaboration of the media, the poor
public opinion has sustained and, therefore, further alienates
users. This problem is one of the most difficult to address as
it deals with changing the opinions of users, something that
traditionally is very difficult. To achieve this there are many
different techniques including a thorough education process,
identifying that biometric environments are as safe, and not
as portrayed within popular media alongside a progressive
and systematic inclusion of the technology within popular
mediums. For example, the inclusion of biometric security
options within smart devices will allow the users to become
familiar with the technology and hopefully more accepting of
different security methods in general.
G. Noise
Many of the factors that are relevant for noise within bio-
metric and liveness detection will also be relevant for coercion.
However, there are some subtle differences as coercion is not
authenticating or verifying a user. Simply identifying if the
user is being coerced or not. Therefore, while the effect of
noise is important, it will not have the same degree of impact
as it does within the initial biometric security process. While
it may not have the same degree of importance as biometric
security it is still needed so that the exact effect noise has on
coercion detection is understood. The traditional understanding
is that noise provides extra data that detracts from the overall
sample, therefore making it harder to gather specific features.
As most coercion detection techniques are based around
medical data and it has been shown that medical noise can exist
from a variety of sources such as exertion, medical condition,
etc. This noise will make the sample deviate somewhat from
the expected range, therefore potentially preventing coercion
acceptance. One theory could include the integration of robust
coercion detection algorithms that attempt to remove any noise
that occurs. The identification of what form the noise data takes
is something that must be considered. Is the noise medical in
nature as discussed earlier, if so what are the potential proofs
against it and how can it be dealt with? Are other factors,
such as environmental, changing the sample enough to impact
the authentication process and if so how susceptible is the
technique to these factors? These factors must be taken into
account when constructing coercion detection techniques as
without these factors being addressed the more chance that a
security threat will occur and if this threat can exist then the
overall effectiveness of the system will be reduced accordingly.
The sub areas have identified th salient factors a coercion
detection technique must have, therefore the following section
will highlight some of the techniques developed.
V. NOVEL TECHNIQUES
As mentioned one of the major flaws of coercion detection
is the lack of techniques. The following four techniques cover
both voluntary and involuntary styles, and as Figure 2 shows
these technique can be used within different areas of the
biometric process, even though they are gathered around the
sample provision threat vector.
1) Tangible Key Technique: The first technique to be
considered is Tangible Key Technique (TKT) which revolves
around the use of a specific piece of hardware or software
that is tangible (in its base form, or requiring additional
hardware such as a phone in the case of an application).
The main advantage of this technique is that the device is
heterogeneous and, therefore, it does not discriminate against
users, subsequently, it can be used within across almost any
technique. For example a fingerprint sample cannot function if
the user does not have fingers that would cause collectability
problems as well as discriminating against the user. However a
TKT does not have these problems as the device can be easily
developed to take into account the specific issues it faces.
However there are some issues surrounding these devices: for
example if a technique uses tangible media then it can be
stolen, lost or damaged, an app can be corrupted or the medium
it is installed on can be stolen, damaged, etc. [24]. It also
relies on the user to make sure they always carry the device,
something less of an issue when considering an app, but still
an important contribution. Therefore, it would be best if the
device was small enough to be easily transportable.
This technique would work within the decision stage of the
biometric process, as it would be able to overrule the sample
being collected. IF this technique was used and the technique
has been activated, then the sample provided would be ignored
instead the TKT would indicate that a refusal should occur
within the decision maker, therefore disallowing the attacker
access.
2) Skin Conductivity Response Tests: Skin conductivity re-
sponse signs can change when subject to strong emotions. The
physiological signs of these emotions provide the information
that is needed to detect the state of a user, in the case of
coercion detection, these emotions would focus on negative
ones such as fear and disgust[25] [26]. This technique requires
additional hardware and is prone to user noise such as the
effects of cosmetic, skin-care products and medical factors
that can change the test including medication ingestion and
generic medical variations [27]. The main advantage of this
technique is that it has the potential to be very accurate and
can be used easily within a fusion based system, due to its
use within liveness and initial sample collection techniques.
However, this technique has one caveat as it is dependent on
background research and while this physiological testing has
been considered for some years the application within coercion
detection is very new and, therefore, it would be necessary to
take every caution when integrating the technique.
This technique would work within the feature extractor
stage of the biometric process. Whilst the biometric data is
being gathered and features being extracted, the skin conduc-
tivity response test would also have its features extracted and it
would then be checked against the data range denote coercion.
If it is outside this range then it will return a negative access
response to the decision maker.
3) Intentional False Authentication: Intentional False Au-
thentication (IFA) checks if a user is being coerced by allowing
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them to provide a sample that is deliberately incorrect. For
example instead of using the index finger to authenticate the
user will use a designated different finger or the thumb and
when this is detected the system automatically knows that the
users are being coerced. The main advantages of this technique
are that it can be applied to almost all other biometric and
liveness techniques, as the user has merely to designate a
separate authentication sample to be registered as the coercion
measure. This can be done by the user or by the system and
has some advantages, for example, there is a limited need
for additional hardware as the sample being used is from the
same type and the heterogeneity it affords is excellent as most
samples will have an easily identified alternative. One major
flaw with this technique is that it relies on the user more
than others. Normally the user has to provide a sample to
authenticate into the system. However this technique would
also require them to not only remember what their false sample
is, but also be able to provide it without the attacker noticing.
This not only adds the issue of user subtlety but also could
potentially provoke the attacker if discovered, both of which
need to be minimised.
This technique would work within the sensor stage of the
biometric process. Whilst the biometric data is being gathered
the user would provide a false sample, different fingerprint etc,
which would stop cause a failure to occur when matching to
the fingerprint database, or within the sensor itself, depending
on the style of biometric.
4) Facial Micro-Movement: Facial Micro-Movement
(FMM), which is based on FACs [28], is a novel technique
that is based around the detection of emotion and the
corresponding physiological characteristics therein. Within
coercion detection, the obvious focus is on negative emotions
and ones that can be associated with coercion detection,
mainly fear, anger, distress, etc. This technique is based
on the FACS which has been used within the affect testing
area for some years and has been identified as the superior
technique in the area [28] [29] due to the higher accuracy
and ease of use. The main advantage of FMM is that it is
very heterogeneous as there is minimal additional hardware
needed and only some additional software to help decipher
the AU (action units) that make up the data collection process.
However while the technique works well with facial based
techniques it obviously has no connection to other styles
therefore potentially limiting its usefulness. One other issue to
contend with is that FACs is often different depending on who
has coded the system, as there is a degree of change from
coder to coder. It is imperative that all use of this techniques
follow the same coding pattens to enable good testing and
analysis to occur.
This technique would work within the sensor stage of the
biometric process. As the FACs would be able to denote if the
user is being coerced by identifying the AUs denoting fear,
anger etc. This would then be compared with templates within
the template database and an appropriate response could be
made.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper identifies the appropriate coercion threat vec-
tors, and highlights that sample provision is the primary
threat. Then a number of techniques have been identified,
along with underlying characteristics that would allow coercion
detection to occur. The key factor to continue is to highlight the
individual techniques and create experimental tests to check for
suitability and applicability. Currently a TGK is a good method
of coercion detection, but has some innate problems such as
ease of loss and counterfeiting. Whereas a IFA theoretically
can be very accurate, but relies heavily on the acceptance
and reliability of the user. These factors need to be correlated
and classified, ideally within a taxonomy which would enable
researchers and users to better understanding their strengths
and weaknesses.
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